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ABSTRACT
Borrower debt relief stands as a widely utilized, yet deeply contentious economic policy enacted
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INTRODUCTION
Credit market stimulus programs such as borrower debt relief have become known as the
“feel-good economic policy of the millennium” (Easterly 2001, 20). Debt relief, however, is not
as radical or novel as one might think it is. Historically, governments are known to have instituted
programs for loan forgiveness during times of economic hardship (Mukherjee, Subramanian, and
Tantri 2018). Some modern policies credit their foundations back to religious texts, all of which
note the rewards and virtues associated with forgiving debt and view the practice as a form of
economic reboot (Berman 2021). One of the first legal codes, the Code of Hammurabi enacted in
1772 BCE, also advocates such relief (Mian and Sufi 2014).
The Economic Effect of Debt Relief: A Persisting Question
Despite the longstanding prevalence of borrower debt relief, current evidence on its
economic impact remains inconsistent and its associated policies continue to be debatable among
economists and policymakers. Arguments for and against such interventions derive from their
perceived impact on economic activity, market inefficiencies, and behaviors of borrowers and
lenders.
Proponents argue that extreme levels of household debt alter optimal investment and
production behavior (Giné and Kanz 2018). Consequently, debt relief holds the promise of
improving the productivity of beneficiary households. It is further argued that relief in times of
economic crises could have the power to strengthen household balance sheets and prevent large
deadweight loss (Mian and Sufi 2014).
By contrast, critics question whether ex post market intervention can impact investment or
productivity and therefore have a real economic effect (De and Tantri 2014; Giné and Kanz 2018;
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Kanz 2016). The huge cost of government intervention in credit markets, too, is often cited (Cole
2009; Dinç 2005; Khwaja and Mian 2005; La Porta, Lopez-De‐Silanes, and Shleifer 2002).
Beyond the direct cost of writing off loans, a parallel indirect cost may materialize in writing off
a culture of prudent borrowing and repayment (Kanz 2016). Moral hazard may emerge if
borrowers strategically respond to a debt forgiveness program by borrowing and investing heavily
under the expectation that they will be bailed out again (Kanz 2016). Adverse consequences from
the lenders’ side may emerge at one extreme if lending institutions, seemingly insured by the
possibility of relief, choose to take on more risk and lend to borrowers who are more likely to
default (Giné and Kanz 2018). At another extreme, they may rationally anticipate unfavorable
changes in borrower behavior and start rationing credit as a result (De and Tantri 2014). The
empirical evidence examining the change in borrower and lender behavior in the wake of largescale loan forgiveness is sparse.
Scope
This paper evaluates the impact of a women-targeted mass borrower bailout program in
Jordan, spearheaded by King Abdullah II and implemented by the government in 2019, on credit
market outcomes of formal microfinance institutions (MFIs). This intervention was driven by the
emergence of a local phenomenon known as AlGharimat amid Jordan’s microfinance landscape.
AlGharimat (which means indebted women in Arabic) refers to the rapid rise in the number of
distressed women borrowers who were defaulting on their uncollateralized microloans and
consequently being prosecuted by the justice system. As the issue attracted significant media
attention, the King initiated a national effort on March 21, 2019, to raise $8.89 million and repay
the debt of 6,481 women whose loans do not exceed $1,410 each (Jordan Times 2019b).

3

By adopting a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, this paper examines the differential
impact of the intervention on outcomes that include proportion of women borrowers, loan portfolio
outstanding for more than 30 days, number of new loans disbursed per capita, and size of new
loans disbursed as proxies for MFI activity and risk. It uses two different strategies to identify
exposure to treatment and compare outcomes in the pre-intervention and the post-intervention
periods. The first strategy uses men as a control group for women. The second strategy compares
the regions most exposed to treatment relative to those that were less exposed. Section II presents
a brief institutional background on Jordan’s microfinance landscape, borrowing dynamics and the
intervention of 2019. Section III summarizes the existing literature on this area of study. Section
IV explains the theoretical frameworks and hypotheses upon which I posit my predictions. Section
V discusses my data and empirical strategy. I present and discuss my results in Section VI, and
thereafter conclude in Section VII.
In this paper, I use the terms microfinance and microcredit interchangeably to denote
microcredit activity. I also use the term regions to refer to Jordan’s 12 administrative divisions
known as governorates.
Contribution and Significance
Evaluating the effect of credit market interventions such as borrower bailout on credit
market outcomes in the context of Jordan’s microfinance environment intends to address two main
gaps in the existing literature on the political economy of credit and may be of interest to several
stakeholders. First, despite similar interventions being relatively common and opposing theories
surrounding them persisting, little concrete evidence exists around their implications. Much of the
sparse evidence has been examined in the context of developed markets and occasionally in
emerging developing markets, but rarely, if ever, in frontier markets like Jordan. These
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implications are central to informing not only future decision making and public policy, but also
microfinance product development. Second, the outcomes of this intervention and the wider
economic impact of Jordan’s microfinance landscape are of significant interest, but not thoroughly
empirically researched. The activities of MFIs in the country stand at the important nexus of
international funding and stakeholder interest. Significant sums of foreign aid and donor funding
are dedicated to this sector (Ward 2014). This means that the local community, regulators, and
NGOs, as well as the international community all have a stake in the ultimate performance of MFI
activities and their interaction with government interventions in the country.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Microfinance in Jordan
Today, the microfinance sector in Jordan serves 476 thousand borrowers, with an average
loan balance per borrower of $788 (Khaled, Brown and Saleh 2021). The current serviceable
available market stands at 1 million potential clients: equivalent to 10% of the country’s population
(Khaled et al. 2021). Clients primarily borrow for business, developmental, and consumption
purposes. Largely operating as a non-profit sector, microfinance in the country currently claims to
build economic capacity in local communities and further the implementation of the Central Bank
of Jordan (CBJ)’s financial inclusion strategy (Hauser, Pavelesku, and Vacarciuc 2017). But the
origins of the microfinance landscape in the country can be traced to 1994 when Save the Children
launched a successful Group Guaranteed Lending & Savings Program, which was ultimately
registered as an independent NGO in 1996 (Isaia 2005). Two years later, the United States Agency
for International Development launched the Achievement of Market-Friendly Initiatives and
Results program in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation with
the goal of establishing a sustainable microfinance sector (Khaled et al. 2021). The uptick in the
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number of MFIs began around 2003, as such lending institutions were established under the
Ministry of Industry and Trade but not actively supervised or regulated (Hauser, Pavelesku, and
Vacarciuc 2017; Khaled et al. 2021). The period of unregulated MFIs ended in 2014 when the
Cabinet approved the Microfinance Companies Bylaw (5/2015) which paved the way for the CBJ
to formally supervise the sector (Hauser, Pavelesku, and Vacarciuc 2017). This process was fully
implemented in 2018 when nine official MFIs were licensed (Denadi and Nzebil 2018). The
Microfinance Association of Jordan was established in 2001 to support the development of the
sector but was ultimately replaced by Tanmeyah network in 2007, which currently represents
Jordan’s ten officially licensed MFIs (Denadi and Nzebil 2018).
The Rise of AlGharimat: Causes and Effects
The phenomenon of AlGharimat only emerged in 2017, after the official licensing and
regulation of these institutions went underway in 2015 (Khaled et al. 2021). While some of the
women affected were defaulting on loans obtained from the ten regulated MFIs, the vast majority
were clients of unregulated MFIs and financial service providers (Bazian 2019). Still, the impact
of those unregulated providers brought significant negative attention and scrutiny to the sector as
a whole and led to interventions at the highest levels of government (Jordan Times 2019b). These
interventions implicated the formal microfinance sector in addition to the unsupervised financing
institutions (Khaled et al. 2021).
While the origins of AlGharimat are difficult to ascertain, they may be attributed to factors
such as lender behavior, external events, characteristics of the aggregate market, and irrational
borrower behavior. Some evidence in other contexts points towards the idea that growth,
saturation, and increased competition in the aggregate market may cause lenders to relax standards
as loan repayments deteriorate (Schicks and Rosenberg 2011). Overly aggressive marketing and
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providing borrowers with incomplete or inaccurate information when making decisions may also
add to risk (Schicks and Rosenberg 2011). Both ideas are applicable to the informal microlending
environment in Jordan, especially when it comes to the exploitation of women borrowers by
informal lenders through high interest rates and over-lending (Market Research 2019). This is
well-documented in an extensive body of local media reports (Market Research 2019; Sweis
2020a; Welsh 2019). Naturally, unexpected external shocks faced by clients may impair their
ability to repay their loans. Yet growing evidence points to the idea that some of the impetus
driving this phenomenon stems from irrational borrower biases in weighing the present
gratification of borrowing more than future consequences of repayment (Schicks and Rosenberg
2011). While empirical analysis on this issue is lacking, case-study narratives based on interviews
with women borrowers in Jordan suggest its existence (Sweis 2020a; Welsh 2019). The
exacerbation of the AlGharimat issue between 2017 and 2019 is likely precipitated by the
simultaneous interaction of these factors.
The Intervention of 2019
The issue of AlGharimat became so pronounced that it attracted the attention of media
outlets and public figures including journalists, religious personalities, members of parliament,
and ministers (Khaled et al. 2021; Sweis 2020b). It became a topic of public discussion as activists
and relatives of women in debt held protests (Sweis 2020b). Against this backdrop, the King led
the direct intervention effort on March 21, 2019 (which marks Mothers’ Day in the country), to
initiate a national effort to support 5,672 women whose loans do not exceed $1410 each (Jordan
Times 2019b). At the time, 30 of those women were already incarcerated for unpaid debts and
released upon bailout (Khaled et al. 2021). He announced this program by calling in to a popular
morning show on national television and urged Jordanians to contribute to this effort (Jordan
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Times 2019c). Ultimately, the program raised around $10 million and repaid the debt of 6,481
women in total (Sweis 2020b). Most of the beneficiaries were borrowers from unregulated
microcredit institutions, with only a negligible number of borrowers originating from formally
regulated MFIs (Bazian 2019; Khaled et al. 2021). The lenders incurred no losses.
Beyond the direct bailout outcome, the intervention garnered significant support and
fundraising towards what is known as the AlGharimat fund, which was tasked with covering future
outstanding loans issued by MFIs and other financial institutions to women borrowers (Jordan
Times 2019c; Khaled et al. 2021). The fund is administered and managed by the Zakat Fund, one
of the oldest and most consolidated legal systems in the country that channels Muslims’ religious
obligation to donate a portion of their wealth to charitable causes (Khaled et al. 2021; Machado,
Bilo and Helmy 2018). Consequently, the support directed at this fund and its amplified role
suggests the simultaneous emergence of a strong promise of future bailout and intervention for
women borrowers.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Impact on Efficiency, Borrower and Lender Behavior
In one of the earliest studies to examine the impact of political intervention in debt
contracts, Alston (1984) examines the case of relief legislation in response to farm foreclosures
during the interwar period in the United States. The paper shows that if lenders expect a high
chance of intervention, they may adopt credit rationing which would reduce ex ante efficiency.
Bolton and Rosenthal (2002), motivated by the same debt moratoria laws of the Great Depression
period, consider an agrarian economy in which poor farmers borrow from rich farmers and debt
contracts are costlessly enforceable. They overcome the problem of credit rationing shown by
Alston by studying a political system where intervention is politically feasible only after a bad
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economic shock. By comparing equilibria with and without political intervention, they show that
in a situation in which adverse economic shocks are probable, state-contingent debt moratoria
increase ex post efficiency. If lenders perceive that an intervention is state-contingent and an
adverse state of nature is sufficiently unlikely, then state‐contingent debt moratoria also improve
ex ante efficiency by completing debt contracts that would be otherwise incomplete. Similarly,
borrowers’ decisions are not influenced by expectations of possible future interventions since they
are perceived to be only state-contingent.
De and Tantri (2014) study borrower and lender behavior in the context of a large-scale
$14.4 billion debt waiver in India in 2008 as an emerging economy where political interventions
are possible even in a normal state of nature. They find that unconditional debt forgiveness results
in ex post inefficiency by providing incentives to borrowers to default strategically in anticipation
of further relief. This propels creditors to practice credit rationing, generating ex ante inefficiency.
They further show that the expectation of future relief contributes towards ex post inefficiency by
encouraging bank loan officers to deny a bad loan on their records and therefore grant extensions
on debt repayments. Mukherjee et al. (2018) study the causal effect of the same program on
distressed borrowers relative to non-distressed or strategic borrowers and find that targeting debt
relief to distressed borrowers can improve its efficacy.
Impact on Investment and Productivity
Current literature points to two main mechanisms by which large-scale credit market
stimuli may impact household investment and productivity, especially in developing markets
where households are more vulnerable to higher levels of poverty and income shocks. First, debt
relief can increase productivity, and reduce deadweight losses during harsh economic
circumstances via theories of debt overhang and risk-shifting (Bolton and Rosenthal 2002; Jensen
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and Meckling 1976; Krugman 1988; Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013; Myers 1977). Specifically, heavily
indebted borrowers may forego sound investments because any returns on those investments
would be channeled into debt repayment or may undertake excessively risky investments seeing
as much of the downside‐risk is borne by lenders. Second, “poverty trap” mechanisms maintain
that indebted households remain in a low productivity equilibrium because household income less
debt repayment may not be sufficient for investments in human or physical capital (Banerjee 2000;
Banerjee and Newman 1993; Mookherjee and Ray 2003).
In response to these arguments, critics question whether ex post credit market interventions
can meaningfully affect real economic activity (Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Hassler 2005;
Agarwal et al. 2017) and contend that credit market interventions are a harmful way of enacting a
stimulus, since they alter the transaction environment and may induce moral hazard. Kanz (2016)
uses the same large-scale 2008 Indian debt relief program to examine investment and productivity
outcomes and finds no effect on savings, consumption, and investment as predicted by the
previously mentioned theories. Instead, the paper finds that debt relief causes more reliance on
informal credit and precipitates moral hazard with beneficiaries being less worried about
repercussions of future default.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
To clearly exposit the framework upon which I base my hypotheses, I present a simple
theoretical model below, based on a similar one proposed by De and Tantri (2014), that considers
the incentive design elements of the credit market in Jordan. Before and after the intervention, MFI
men and women borrowers choose to repay or default on their uncollateralized loans by
considering the expected returns from each option. Intervention-related changes may influence
expected returns and outcomes. Lenders choose whether to grant potential borrowers loans and the
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terms of such loans (e.g., extension periods). If borrowers default, they confront the downside risk
of up to 90 days in prison per debt contract in addition to the risk of being denied new loan requests
in the formal regulated credit market. On the flip side, if defaulters are offered relief, they face the
upside potential of having their debt repaid in full by the government and receiving the opportunity
to continue to borrow in the future. These two outcomes act in tension and are influenced by the
borrower’s type, gender, and credit history.
The Setting and Key Assumptions
In this model I assume two states, determined by the timing of the intervention, where 𝑡 =
0 and 𝑡 = 1 denote the timing before and after the relief, respectively. Borrowers can be classified
into two groups: men and women. Each group contains two types of borrowers: type 1 (good) and
type 2 (bad). The proportions of the two types of borrowers are identical in both populations and
can be denoted by 𝜋 and (1 − 𝜋). Type 1 borrowers invest their loans to obtain 𝜃 returns with 𝑝!
probability and 0 returns with (1 − 𝑝! ) probability. Type 2 borrowers invest their loans to obtain
𝜃 returns with 𝑝" probability and 0 returns with (1 − 𝑝" ) probability.
For simplicity, there exists only one formally regulated microfinance institution that lends
to all borrowers at a constant regulated interest rate 𝑟# . I also assume that all loans carry a face
value of 1 such that the amount to be repaid in one period is 𝐿 = 1 + 𝑟# .
Alongside this formal regulated MFI, there exists an informal unregulated market for MFIs
and moneylenders that provides loans at a higher constant interest rate 𝑟$ where 𝑟$ > 𝑟# .
At 𝑡 = 0, the probability of future debt relief for men 𝑃$ = 0 and women 𝑃% = 0. At 𝑡 =
1, men borrowers still expect no relief with 𝑃$ = 0, but women borrowers expect relief with
probability 𝑃% > 0 given the existence of a dedicated bailout fund for women.
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The model assumes that any debt relief decision targeted at women is made after the
borrower defaults. I assume that all actors are risk neutral.
The Decision of the MFI
Before the intervention (𝒕 = 𝟎)
The loan officer at the MFI only observes the applicants’ gender and their credit history,
specifically whether they defaulted on their loan in the previous period and whether the loan was
repaid by the government. Although they do not observe the type of the applicant, they know the
proportion of each type in the population. The officer offers the same rate to all borrowers but uses
this information to choose whether to offer the loan and the terms of the contract.
Good loans and bad loans impact the officer’s performance record positively and
negatively, respectively. The officer receives no reward for good performance but is penalized
through the penalty rate 𝜏 for bad performance, proportionally. It follows that before the relief
program, the officer is incentivized to choose a borrower who would be less likely to default.
After the intervention (𝒕 = 𝟏)
Two primary forces influence the MFI officer’s decision after the relief program. Their
implications on credit market outcomes, however, act in opposite in directions. The extent to which
one force takes over the other is likely decided by the size of 𝑃% and 𝜏, which remain unknown.
Moral hazard. When defaulting borrowers are relieved, the value of their debt is repaid in
full by the government to the MFI. Since 𝑃% > 0 after the intervention, officers will be faced with
the possibility of government relief for future defaulting women borrowers. Such a prospect could
be viewed, in expectation, as a form of insurance against the risks associated with lending to this
group. This higher expectation of insurance may incentivize officers to lend to a greater number
of women, increasing exposure to risk, while expecting not to bear its cost.
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Response to adverse selection. As long as 𝑃% > 0, women borrowers will consider the
option of defaulting. Of those who defaulted at 𝑡 = 0, only women borrowers who were bailed out
are permitted to reapply for loans at 𝑡 = 1. The posterior probability that a defaulter is a type 2
borrowers is (1 − 𝜋) × (1 − 𝑝" )⁄((1 − 𝜋) × (1 − 𝑝! ) + 𝜋 × (1 − 𝑝! )) > (1 − 𝜋), i.e. the
probability that a defaulter is a type 2 borrower is greater than the proportion of type 2 borrowers
in the population. It follows that the officer perceives women loan applicants as being more likely
to be type 2 than type 1 since they would include applicants who defaulted and were bailed out in
the previous period, whereas men applicants would not. In parallel, MFI officers might predict that
adverse selection among women applicants might take place, with more type 2 women borrowers
believing they are likely to get away with default and having stronger incentives to apply to loans
following the relief.
Assuming the value of bad loans is 𝐵, it follows that if (1 − 𝑃% ) × 𝜏 × 𝐵 > 𝑃% × 𝐵, or the
expected value of the penalty of issuing bad loans outweighs the expected value of the bad loans
being repaid via a relief program, the loan officer will perceive a bad loan, ex ante, as undesirable
despite the possibility of relief. If this holds, the officer, while rationally anticipating adverse
selection among women, will apply stricter measures when evaluating them for loans and ration
the credit they offer them. This would yield an overall smaller number of women borrowers. In
parallel, they may opt to reallocate capital from riskier to safer recipients. Since in this setting they
would view women as riskier than men, reallocation would ensue from women to men borrowers.
The Decision of the Borrower
The two groups of borrowers (men and women) choose between either repaying the loan
by its due date or defaulting. The borrower’s decision would depend on the present expected value
of future returns of each decision option. I assume that any bailout decision would occur after the
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due date of the loan, therefore the borrowers must make their repayment decision prior to the
announcement of any future relief.
Before the intervention (𝒕 = 𝟎)
If a borrower decides to repay the loan, they are granted the opportunity of future borrowing
in the formal market. Since the probabilities of future bailout before the intervention is 𝑃% = 𝑃$ =
0, the decision of default versus repayment depends only on the borrowers’ returns on their loans
(𝜃 or 0). As a result, in the scenario in which the borrower chooses to repay their loan, the expected
value today of future returns for borrower of type 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2) is 𝑅& = 𝜃 × 𝑝& ⁄𝑟# . By contrast, in
the scenario in which the borrower chooses to default on their loan, they are denied future
borrowing in the formal market and must borrow at the higher rate 𝑟$ in the informal market.
Therefore, the present expected value of future returns for would be 𝐷& = 𝜃 × 𝑝& ⁄𝑟$ . Since
𝑅& > 𝐷& the borrower will be inclined to repay their debt and no perverse incentives exist in the
credit market for borrowers before the intervention.
After the intervention (𝒕 = 𝟏)
Moral hazard and adverse selection among women. From the borrowers’ standpoint,
the key variables that change after the relief are the probabilities of future debt relief 𝑃% and
𝑃$ . Since the probability remains unchanged for men with 𝑃$ = 0, it can be expected that men
borrowers will have identical incentive structures before and after the relief. But since the
probability for women changes to 𝑃% > 0, the decision of default versus repayment for women
borrowers after the intervention depends not only on the returns on their loans (𝜃 or 0), but also
on 𝑃% . In the scenario in which the borrower chooses to repay their loan, the present expected
value of future returns for borrower of type 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2) is 𝑅& = 𝜃 × 𝑝& ⁄𝑟# regardless of whether a
new bailout program is activated or not. Conversely, if the borrower chooses to default, two
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different scenarios arise. First, if a new bailout program takes place, the present expected value of
future returns for the defaulting borrower would be 𝑅& + 𝐿. Second, if a new bailout program does
not take place, the borrower can choose to repay her loan with a present expected value of 𝑅& , or
alternatively not repay her loan, resort to the informal market to borrow, and have a present
expected value of 𝐷& . Using 𝑃% as the probability of the relief, the overall expected value of future
returns upon no default would be 𝑅& , whereas the overall expected value of future returns upon
default would be 𝐸& = 𝑃% × (𝑅& + 𝐿) + (1 − 𝑃% ) × (0.5 × 𝑅& + 0.5 × 𝐷& ). If the value of 𝐸& >
𝑅& , or the overall expected returns from defaulting are higher than the overall expected returns
from repayment I expect to see higher default rates and moral hazard among women, and by
extension, higher default rates overall through the portfolio at risk for more than 30 days (PAR>30)
variable. At the same time, the downside risk of obtaining loans may be perceived as less costly to
women borrowers, which may prompt a larger pool of potential borrowers to apply for loans,
resulting in adverse selection. This would correspond to an increase in numbers of women
borrowers variable, all else being equal. If this statement does not hold, no effects would be
observed on the PAR>30 and number of women borrowers variables. The decision tree process
for both borrower groups is shown in the diagram below.
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Figure 1 Theoretical decision tree for
borrowers at t = 0

Figure 2 Theoretical decision tree for
borrowers at t = 1
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DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Tanmeyah’s Annual Reports MFI Metrics
I examine the impact of the Jordanian government’s AlGharimat 2019 relief intervention
using a quarterly panel dataset on formal MFI market outcomes in each of the 12 regions of Jordan
over the 15-quarter period from Q1 of 2017 until Q3 of 2020. The dataset is sourced from the
publicly available quarterly reports of Tanmeyah (Jordan’s official formal microfinance network).
The timeframe of the data is determined by the availability of complete information on all metrics.
Included in the data are two types of information for each region per quarter. First: overall
aggregate credit activity and performance metrics (active borrowers; active loans; average
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No
Default
𝑫𝒊

outstanding loan size; number of branches, percentage of aggregate women borrowers; portfolio
at risk for more than 30 days; loans written off). Second: incremental quarterly credit activity
(number of new loans disbursed, amount of new loans disbursed, size of new loans disbursed).
The two types of data may be viewed as stock and flow variables, respectively.
I use additional public data from the Jordanian Department of Statistics for population and
macroeconomic information such as unemployment and inflation to supplement the analysis.
Country-level summary statistics
Table 1 below reports summary statistics for the main country-level metrics available over
the full period of the dataset.
Table 1:
Summary Statistics for the data, Q1 2017 – Q3 2020
Mean
Number of active borrowers
Number of active loans
Percentage of women borrowers
Portfolio at Risk for more than 30 days (PAR>30)
Percentage of loans written off
Number of branches
Number of new loans disbursed
Amount of new loans disbursed
Size of new loans disbursed

449330
439911
71%
3%
0.5%
195
78173
67339260
880

Median
459551
444282
72%
2%
0.4%
197
81852
69696273
879

SD
22613
18845
3.5%
4%
0.14%
6
13242
10705247
42

Difference-in-Differences Estimation
I utilize a difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology to estimate the average treatment
effect of the intervention on the four main outcomes of interest at the country-level and regionlevel. This estimation approach relies on the assumption that outcomes for treatment and control
follow parallel trends before the intervention, and by extension, would follow parallel trends in the
absence of the intervention. In addition, to verify that the estimated effects are not driven by any
endogeneity of treatment in preexisting trends in the data, I examine trends in variables that are
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not expected to be impacted by the treatment or, in return, influence outcomes. These variables
include unemployment rates and inflation (shown in Appendix A). Given limitations posed by the
granularity in the available data, I draw on two different approaches to define treatment for the
DiD model, which I explore below.
Defining exposure to the intervention and estimating treatment effects
I consider exposure to the bailout program to be the main source of treatment in this setting.
I exploit two unique features of this intervention and its sources of variation to define treatment
for different groups. First, it only targeted women borrowers initially when providing relief.
Second, it promised future relief exclusively to women via the AlGharimat fund thereafter. I use
this “women-only” premise of the program to designate the two approaches to define treatment for
the purposes of estimation, depending on the outcomes examined and the level of heterogeneity
sought in such outcomes.
Approach I: Treatment by gender. To measure the homogenous average treatment effect
in the country at large and in each of the 12 regions, I define women borrowers as the treatment
group and men borrowers as the control group. This approach, however, poses a key limitation
since the only outcome in the data that is given by gender is the number of borrowers.
To estimate the average treatment effect of the intervention on the number of borrowers by
gender, I compare changes in average outcomes between the women borrowers and men borrowers
in the pre and the post treatment periods in each region and in the country at large using the simple
formula below, where 𝑌'() and 𝑌'*+, are the number of borrowers in a group pre and post treatment
respectively (with treatment occurring in Q1 of 2019), and D denoting treatment (1 if women, 0 if
men):
𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸C𝑌'*+, D𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸C𝑌'() D𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸C𝑌'*+, D𝐷 = 0] − 𝐸C𝑌'() D𝐷 = 0]

18

(1)

Approach II: Treatment by region. To overcome the challenge posed by the first
approach, I use data on the prevalence of women borrowers in each region in the pre-intervention
period as a proxy to regional exposure to the bailout. I classify treatment in each region as a binary
high or low, depending on whether the pre-intervention percentage of women borrowers in each
region was above or below the average percentage of women borrowers in all regions. This
approach not only enables the examination of effects on all target outcomes but also the detection
of heterogenous treatment effects within and across regions. Using the data available in the preintervention period, I further characterize the levels of wealth and risk in different regions as high
or low based on whether the average outstanding loan size and portfolio at risk metrics were above
or below average in each region, respectively.
Following this definition of treatment, I use 180 quarter-region observations and the
following basic DiD model specification to estimate the average treatment effect on all target
outcomes, where i denotes region and t denotes quarter:
!"

!.

𝑌&, = 𝛼 + 𝜆 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡& + M 𝛽& 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛& + M 𝛽, 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟, + 𝜀
&-"

(2)

,-"

The coefficient 𝜆 represents the total DiD estimate over time, with 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡& being a dummy
that equals 1 when the region i is a treatment region in the post-intervention period. The third and
fourth terms capture region-specific and time-specific fixed effects, respectively. 𝑌&, denotes the
target outcome(s) in region i during quarter t, namely: number of women borrowers; PAR>30; size
of new loans disbursed; number of new loans disbursed per capita.
To examine heterogenous treatment effects across regions by wealth and risk, I adapt (2)
to (3):
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!.

𝑌&, = 𝛼 + 𝜆 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡& + M 𝛽& 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛& + M 𝛽, 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟, + 𝛽% 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡& ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ&
&-"

,-"

+𝛽( 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡& ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘& + 𝜀

Where the fifth and sixth terms are the interaction of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡& with the dummies for wealth
and risk in regions, respectively.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Checking the Internal Validity of the DiD Design
To verify the main assumptions upon which the DiD design rests, I start by demonstrating
parallel trends in outcomes of interest under the two treatment approaches and follow it by
examining the trends in variables expected to be unaffected by the treatment over time.
Figure 3 shows the parallel trends in the number of borrowers by gender before and after
the intervention. A similar trajectory in growth is seen among the two groups in the preintervention period, which is necessary for the validity of the gender-based treatment approach.
Figure 4 presents the pre-treatment and post-treatment trends in the outcome variables of interest
for control and treatment regions in the treatment-based approach. Similar distributions across the
four variables are observed.
Figure 1 Trend in number of active borrowers by gender pre and post treatment
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(3)

Figure 2 Trends in outcome variables over time in treatment and control regions

DiD Model Estimates
Approach I
Table 2 presents the homogenous difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of the
treatment on the number of women borrowers across the 12 regions of the country using men
borrowers as a control for women borrowers. The estimates are calculated by finding the pre-post
difference in averages across the groups in each region, as shown in equation 1. The regions with
the largest and the smallest losses in the number of women borrowers are Karak and Jarash,
respectively. The total decrease in number of women borrowers amounts to 30,258. This drop is
shown visually in Figure 3, where not only a drop in the number of women borrowers in the postperiod, but also a jump in the number of men borrowers is observed. This dual effect implies that
there is possibly a spillover effect from the treatment to the control, resulting in an overestimate
of the treatment effect. Taking this into consideration and noting the size of the drop in the men’s
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group, I take half of the estimate (15,129) to be a more accurate reflection of effect on number of
women borrowers. Any effect on the number of borrowers here, again, is not directly influenced
by the bailout aspect of the intervention but rather the indirect behavioral response, since only a
trivial share of the women bailed out were clients of the formal MFI network (Khaled et al. 2021).
Table 2: Homogenous DiD Estimates of Effect of Treatment on Number of Women Borrowers by Region Using
Men as a Control for Women
Region
Karak
Amman
Irbid
Ajlun
Zarqa
Aqaba
Tafileh
Maan
Mafraq
Balqa
Madaba
Jarash
Total

DiD Estimate for Effect on
Number of Women Borrowers
-7596
-6514
-5150
-3096
-2967
-2232
-1565
-1497
-743
83
365
654
-30258

Notes: Estimates here are calculated using equation (1)
above, where men are considered the control group and
women are considered the treatment group. Results
here are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Approach II
Table 3 below presents the basic DiD parameter estimates, without accounting for fixed
effects, on each of the four outcomes of interest when assigning treatment by region. Using a 1%
significance estimate, the estimate in the first column indicates that the intervention had a
statistically significant and negative impact on the percentage of women borrowers in treated
regions. Specifically, treated regions witnessed an 8.9% decline in women borrowers relative to
control regions. The effect on other outcomes appears negligible in size and not statistically
significant. The 𝑅" values are on the weaker end. When accounting for fixed effects in regions
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and quarters, Table 4 shows that the effect of the treatment on the percentage of women borrowers
remains similar and significant at 8.2%, but the estimates for PAR>30, average size of new loans,
and log of number of new loans per capita all switch signs, with the effect on log of number of
new loans per capita being small but statistically significant at the 10% level.
The significant effects on the number and percentage of women borrowers observed in
both treatment approaches corroborate the hypothesis for credit rationing among MFIs. The
decline in active women borrowers among formal MFI clients is unlikely to be driven by the
bailout itself since almost all relief beneficiaries belonged to the informal sector (Khaled et al.
2021). While MFI officers could theoretically be expected to engage in moral hazard by
overlending to women, the overall decline implies that the effect of rationing in response to
anticipated adverse selection among women borrowers overrides any effect of moral hazard. In
other words, the observed outcomes imply that the expected value of the penalty associated with
bad loans from the perspective of the MFI officer outweighs any perceived benefit in future
insurance for bad loans.
The increase in new loans per capita in treated regions, although small, may be a symptom
of the spillover effect in active borrowers from men to women seen in Figure 3. More generally,
the pattern observed could be manifesting as not only credit rationing among women borrowers
but also credit reallocation from women to men driven by the MFIs’ response to anticipated
adverse selection. The negligible impacts on the PAR>30 variable could be explained as the
outcome of stricter measures by the MFIs in disbursing new loans, such that the pool of new
borrowers is chosen to minimize risk, despite the propensity of existing active borrowers to default
and engage in riskier behavior post-intervention.
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Examining heterogeneity in outcomes, Table 4 indicates that only the differential impacts
of wealth on loan size, and risk on number of loans per capita are statistically significant.
Borrowers in wealthier treated regions receive larger loans after the intervention. Those in riskier
treated regions see a smaller number of loans disbursed per capita, which is consistent with the
credit reallocation patterns observed in the other estimates. After accounting for controls, the value
of the 𝑅" predictably rises to stronger levels.
In summary, while the basis of the forgiveness program was largely rooted in easing the
financial burdens of the distressed AlGharimat women in the credit market (Jordan Times 2019a),
I find that the implications of its impacts on the formal MFI outcomes are mixed. In particular, my
findings reveal evidence for significant credit rationing by MFIs among women after the program,
and credit reallocation from women and risky regions to men and safer regions. Contrary to what
is generally predicted by empirical literature, the relief program did not correspond to higher rates
of risk-taking and moral hazard among MFIs.
Table 3: DiD Parameter Estimates of Effects of Treatment on Target Outcomes Using Variation in Regional
Treatment Exposure Without Fixed Effects
Dependent Variables (Outcomes of interest)

Treatment
Post
Post * Treat
R2
Observations

Percentage of
Women Borrowers
(1)

PAR>30
(2)

Avg Size of New Loans
(3)

Log of Number of
New Loans per capita
(4)

0.08778***
(0.00803)

-0.00859
(0.00924)

3.65
(26.37)

-0.00191
(0.07288)

-0.02102
(0.01270)

0.02634
(0.01033)

59.27**
(29.48)

-0.24257***
(0.08148)

-0.08889***
(0.01795)

0.01918
(0.01461)

2.21
(41.69)

0.00620
(0.11523)

0.391

0.128

0.0458

0.0894

180

180

180

180

Notes: Results are from ordinary least squares regression of the DiD analysis. Each of the columns represents the
result of a regression model on the dependent variable of interest. Each of the first three rows represents a term in the
DiD regression. The DiD estimates here are without controlling for fixed effects across regions and quarters.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Table 4: Heterogeneity in DiD Parameter Estimates of Impact of Treatment by Regional Wealth and Risk with
Fixed Effects
Percentage of Women Borrowers
(5)

PAR>30
(6)

Avg Size of New Loans
(7)

Log of Number of
New Loans per Capita
(8)

-0.08171***
(0.02319)

0.015046
(0.019933)

-18.20
(16.67)

0.0557*
(0.0329)

Post ∗ Treat ∗ Wealth

-0.04227
(0.03369)

0.016500
(0.028962)

56.60**
(24.22)

-0.0777
(0.0478)

Post ∗ Treat ∗ Risk

-0.02171
(0.03864)

0.005194
(0.033222)

19.26
(27.78)

-0.0968*
(0.0548)

0.618

0.389

0.943

0.972

180

180

180

180

Post ∗ Treat

R2
Observations

Notes: Results are from ordinary least squares regression of the DiD analysis with region and quarter fixed effects.
Each of the columns represents the result of a regression model on the dependent variable of interest. Each of the first
three rows represents a term in the DiD regression.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level

CONCLUSION
Borrower debt relief remains one of the most commonly utilized economic policies by
governments in the face of crises. Theories that examine the effects of relief programs often predict
negative consequences as adverse selection and moral hazard manifest in changes in credit
allocation, risk-taking, and default. Yet, the empirical evidence examining such theories is
inconsistent and sparse, especially in developing markets.
In this paper, I use the Jordanian government’s March 2019 loan forgiveness program to
estimate the impact of debt relief on credit market outcomes. I employ a difference-in-differences
analysis, leveraging features of the intervention like its exclusive targeting of women borrowers
and its primary beneficiaries being informal MFI clients, to study the effects on four key outcomes
of interest in the formal MFI market: percentage of women borrowers; PAR>30; average size of
new loans disbursed; and number of new loans disbursed per capita.
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The results of the paper reveal that the intervention led to significant credit rationing and
reallocation. Specifically, the number of women borrowers sees a significant decline and credit is
redirected by MFIs from women and areas of higher risk to men and areas of lower risk, possibly
as a response to anticipated adverse selection among women and riskier regions in the postintervention period. This finding is supported by a lack of evidence supporting the idea of moral
hazard among MFIs, with no observable impact on PAR>30 as those institutions adopt stricter
lending measures after the intervention. The impact of this pattern on the overall efficiency of
credit allocation and portfolio risk levels as new loans are directed towards safer borrowers remains
to be seen. Moreover, it gives rise to the question of whether its effects unduly restrict women’s
access to credit more broadly. This is especially pertinent given the initial premise of the relief
program as a form of economic support for women borrowers in response to their preexisting
challenges that include but are not limited to the AlGharimat phenomenon.
Such findings underscore the challenges in designing and implementing debt relief
programs that maximize economic benefit for beneficiaries, while minimizing the encouragement
of perverse incentives among other stakeholders. Another policy design consideration suggested
by this paper that may warrant future research, is the potential for such programs to have
unintended differential consequences on credit accessibility.
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